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Let me start by acknowledging and thanking the Enoch Cree Nation, on whose 
territory we are meeting. 
 
So here we are, 150 years after Confederation, and yet the legal basis for Crown 
sovereignty over Canada remains uncertain. 
 
The standard explanation is that the Crown acquired sovereignty over French 
Canada by cession of Acadia (French possessions in what became the Maritime 
Provinces) by the Treaty of Utrecht in 1713, and by conquest of New France in 
1759-60 and cession by the Treaty of Paris in 1763.  However, this leaves 
unexplained how France got sovereignty over territories that were occupied and 
controlled by Indigenous peoples.  The extent of the French possessions in Canada 
is also an open question. 
 
Over the rest of Canada, the Crown apparently got sovereignty by discovery, 
settlement, or mere assertion – all these possibilities have been offered, though 
none of them has been adequately explained. 
 
To properly analyze this issue, I think a clear distinction has to be made between 
de facto and de jure sovereignty.  De facto sovereignty involves effective control 
of a territory and the actual exercise of jurisdiction on the ground.  It can be shown 
by factual evidence of the exercise of jurisdictional control through military 
presence and the exercise of governmental authority by officials such as 
bureaucrats, police officers, judges and so on who apply and enforce the law.  It 
can also be established by the provision of government services such as surveying, 
postal services, the building and maintaining of roads and other infrastructure, etc. 
 
In Canada, the Crown gained de facto sovereignty over centuries by gradually 
extending its actual control and exercise of jurisdiction.  In the North, this wasn’t 
complete until sometime well into the 20th century, and even now Crown 
sovereignty over the Northwest Passage is contested by some foreign states. 
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De jure sovereignty, on the other hand, involves acknowledgment by a particular 
legal system of acquisition of sovereignty.  This raises a choice of law question: 
which legal system should be used to determine who has sovereignty? 
 
In Canada, there are several choices: 
 
1. The legal systems of the Indigenous peoples in the territory being colonized.  
These include both the internal, domestic legal system of each Indigenous 
nation, and inter-nation legal systems that governed their relations with one 
another. 
 
2. The legal systems of the colonizing Europeans. Again, there are two 
possibilities here: the legal system of the colonizing power, and the law of 
nations or international law, which I prefer to call the European law of 
nations. 
 
3. Intersocietal law developed through interaction between the Indigenous 
peoples and the colonizing nations, primarily through treaties. 
 
The answer these legal systems each give to the question of who has sovereignty 
will not necessarily be the same. 
 
De jure sovereignty is therefore relative – it depends on the application of a 
particular body of law and applies only to the entities with legal personality in that 
body of law.  Taking the law of nations as an example, it would have applied only 
to the European nations that created and were subject to it. 
 
Choosing which legal system to use to determine whether a particular entity like 
the Crown has sovereignty raises a normative issue of legitimacy: which legal 
system should be used?  This is really a political and ethical issue, not a legal one. 
 
So how have Canadian courts dealt with this matter of sovereignty?  With respect, 
I would say in a confused, embarrassed manner. 
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In Delgamuukw v. British Columbia in 1997, Chief Justice Lamer accepted the 
decisions of the lower courts that Crown sovereignty in B.C. had been acquired in 
1846 when Britain and the United States signed the Oregon Boundary Treaty.  This 
implies a choice of international law as the basis for Crown sovereignty because it 
depends on an international treaty. 
 
The Crown sovereignty the Court regarded as acquired in 1846 had to be de jure 
sovereignty because at the time the Crown clearly did not have effective control 
over the Gitxsan and Wet’suwet’en territories that were at issue in Delgamuukw. 
 
So why should a bilateral international treaty determine sovereignty over these 
Indigenous nations that were not subject to international law and that had both the 
control necessary for de facto sovereignty and their own equivalent of de jure 
sovereignty in their own legal orders? 
 
Then in the Haida Nation and Taku River Tlingit First Nation decisions in 2004, 
the Supreme Court began to show some awareness of the confused judicial 
reasoning on this issue.  In those cases, Chief Justice McLachlin acknowledged the 
pre-existing sovereignty of the First Nations in British Columbia for the first time 
and described Crown sovereignty as de facto. 
 
She suggested that the two had to be reconciled through mutually respectful 
negotiations leading to treaties.  Felix Hoehn’s book, Reconciling Sovereignties: 
Aboriginal Nations and Canada (2012), contains a very good analysis of this 
aspect of these decisions. 
 
And then in the Tsilhqot’in Nation decision in 2014, Chief Justice McLachlin 
reverted to the position in Delgamuukw that Crown sovereignty in B.C. dated from 
the Oregon Boundary Treaty of 1846.  What, one may ask, happened to pre-
existing Aboriginal sovereignty and the distinction between de facto and de jure 
sovereignty acknowledged in Haida Nation? 
 
I now want to shift my focus from British Columbia to the Prairies where some of 
the numbered treaties were entered into.  I’m going to talk about one obscure case, 
Canada (MNR) v. Ochapowace Ski Resort, [2002] 4 CNLR 76, from Saskatchewan 
in 2002.  Yes, there are ski resorts in Saskatchewan, where I’m from, in this 
instance in the Qu’Appelle Valley! 
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The Ochapowace First Nation has a ski resort on its reserve, which is in the area of 
Treaty 4 that was entered into in 1874.  They refused to collect GST for Canada 
because they assert that they are in a nation-to-nation relationship with Canada and 
do not have to collect tax for another government.  They created their own tax for 
the patrons of their ski resort, most of whom are not First Nations people.  They 
were convicted for violation of the Canada Excise Tax Act by Justice Rathgeber. 
 
Now this was only a Provincial Court decision so it is not of much value as a legal 
precedent, but in it the issues and the attitude and assumptions of Canadian courts 
were very clearly articulated.  It is therefore valuable for illustrative purposes. 
 
I also have a personal interest in the case because I was one of the expert witnesses 
for the First Nation, on the international law requirements for de jure sovereignty 
to be acquired in the 19th century. 
 
A number of Elders also testified along with some prominent historians and other 
academics, among them Sarah Carter, Jim Miller, Blair Stonechild, and Sharon 
Venne.  In my opinion, these witnesses clearly established that the Indigenous 
nations who had entered into Treaty 4 exercised de facto sovereignty over the 
treaty area prior to 1874, and that the Crown did not have the necessary control 
before the treaty for it to have de facto sovereignty. 
 
The international law witnesses, including myself, testified that in the 1870s this 
body of law would not have conferred de jure sovereignty on the Crown because it 
was not in effective control of the territory. 
 
So the argument for the Ochapowace First Nation was that it had sovereignty – de 
facto, and de jure under its own laws – prior to entering into the treaty, and that the 
treaty was about sharing sovereignty on a nation-to-nation basis, as well as about 
sharing the land.  One way of understanding this would be to think of the treaty as 
creating intersocietal law for the sharing of sovereignty and land. 
 
The Crown did not call any witnesses to rebut the evidence provided by the experts 
to support this argument.  And yet, Justice Rathgeber decided that the Indigenous 
parties to Treaty 4 had not been sovereign and that the Crown acquired sovereignty 
by discovery and the exercise of control at the latest in 1818 when Britain and the 
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Untied States entered into an international convention whereby they agreed that the 
49th parallel would be the boundary between their respective territories on the 
Prairies.  He said the evidence of the experts was “to some extent disappointing 
and in some cases they would more properly be called advocates.”  How he was 
able to dismiss the evidence of those witnesses and arrive at contrary conclusions 
when the Crown did not call any witnesses of its own to rebut this evidence is a 
good question. 
 
But what this case really reveals is the judicial mindset in Canada.  Judges are very 
reluctant to take pre-existing and continuing Indigenous sovereignty into account.  
There was a glimmer of hope in the Haida Nation decision in 2004, decided two 
years after the Ochapowace case, but that glimmer mysteriously disappeared in the 
Tsilhqot’in Nation decision. 
 
Justin Trudeau’s government has said it will implement the UN Declaration on the 
Rights of Indigenous Peoples and seek reconciliation with the Indigenous peoples 
of Canada on a nation-to-nation basis. 
 
But actions speak louder than words – the Crown needs to stop relying on the 
worn-out dogma that it acquired sovereignty in Canada by discovery and mere 
assertion. 
 
It needs to acknowledge the pre-existing and continuing sovereignty of the 
Indigenous peoples in both the treaty and the non-treaty areas of Canada, and work 
with Indigenous peoples to achieve reconciliation on that basis. 
 
This should of course have happened long ago, but surely Canada’s 150th birthday 
is a good time to start to make it actually happen! 
 
More detailed discussion of the issue of Indigenous and Crown sovereignty 
can be found in some of my publications: 
 
“The Doctrine of Discovery Reconsidered: Reflecting on Robert J Miller, Jacinta 
Ruru, Larissa Behrendt, and Tracey Lindberg, Discovering Indigenous Lands: The 
Doctrine of Discovery in the English Colonies and Felix Hoehn, Reconciling 
Sovereignties: Aboriginal Nations and Canada” (2016) 53:2 Osgoode Hall Law 
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Journal 699-728, online: 
http//digitalcommons.osgoode.yorku.ca/ohlj/vol53/iss2/10 
“Sovereignty and Indigenous Peoples in North America” (2016) 22:2 University of 
California Davis Journal of International Law and Policy 81 
 “Factual and Legal Sovereignty in North America: Indigenous Realities and Euro-
American Pretensions”, in Julie Evans, Ann Genovese, Alexander Reilly, and 
Patrick Wolfe, eds., Sovereignty: Frontiers of Possibility (Honolulu: University of 
Hawai‘i Press, 2013), 37 
 “Indigenous Nations and the Legal Relativity of European Claims to Territorial 
Sovereignty in North America”, in Sandra Tomsons and Lorraine Mayer, eds., 
Philosophy and Aboriginal Rights: Critical Dialogues (Don Mills, Ontario: Oxford 
University Press, 2013), 242 
“Negotiated Sovereignty: Indian Treaties and the Acquisition of American and 
Canadian Territorial Rights in the Pacific Northwest”, in Alexandra Harmon, ed., 
The Power of Promises: Rethinking Indian Treaties in the Pacific Northwest 
(Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2008), 35 
 
 
